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Last week, the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) delivered two decisions on the
constitutional complaints of two journalists – Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay.[1] Considering
the conjuncture of Turkey, one could say that the TCC acted relatively brave in delivering
these decisions, like it was the case in its earlier Erdem Gül and Can Dündar[2] decision.
Başak Çalı made an analysis about the case here on the Verfassungsblog. I will not repeat
the facts because she accurately summarised the situation in Turkey. I would like to
present briefly some of the related debates in the Turkish literature on this issue as well as
some prospects for the future.
Originality of the Decisions
The TCC’s decisions were remarkable as they diverge from the judgments of similar nature
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against Turkey on two points:
Firstly, the violations of freedom to liberty and security were found not focusing on the point
of long duration of pre-trial detention, but focusing on “strong suspicion” determination
concerning the first decision ordering detention on remand of the first instance assize
courts. That is to say in terms of the ECHR, the violations were found in relation to Article 5
§ 1 (c) of the Convention (reasonable suspicion), not Article 5 § 3. Such a consideration by
the ECtHR is not very common in Strasbourg case-law regarding the judgments against
Turkey.[3]
Secondly, the TCC made its “strong suspicion” determination in relation to the ongoing
case, unlike Strasbourg’s similar decisions, which were given after the release of the
applicants.[4]
Due to these reasons, the first instance courts are not used to such interference from other
judiciary branches in the ongoing cases. Nevertheless, the TCC’s progressive decisions
were welcomed by a number of politicians and academics. However, the TCC was
criticized by some, including government officials, with the claim that the TCC had
overridden its authority by making an assessment about the “strong suspicion”
determination of the first instance court in the ongoing case and by acting as a “super-
appeal court” (Super-Revisionsgericht). The Courts of Assize, most likely encouraged with
such discourses, declared the decision of the TCC as “null” which is applied in cases of
“usurpation of competence” in the Turkish public law.
Thus, what was experienced in Turkey was at first sight an issue of competence conflict
between the constitutional jurisdiction and the specialized jurisdiction (Kompetenzkonflikt
zwischen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichtsbarkeit). As former ECtHR judge
Lech Garlicki said, such a conflict is always possible in centralized Kelsenian system of
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judicial review since constitutional courts and specialized courts are following the same
path, but not necessarily the same rules and in the same direction.[5] However, as regards
to the right to liberty and security, the rules applicable to the case overlap frequently and
even compulsorily. This arises from the nature of the right to liberty. According to Article 19
of the Constitution: “Individuals against whom there is strong evidence of having committed
an offence may be arrested by decision of a judge (…)”, and Article 100 of the Criminal
Procedure Code stipulates that “in the event that there are facts which tend to present the
existence of a strong suspicion of a crime (…) a detention on remand against the suspect
or accused may be ordered.”
The criteria followed by the criminal courts and the TCC obviously coincide with each other
when it comes to the assessment of strong evidence/strong suspicion for detention.
Moreover, since the Constitution refers directly back to statute and, consequently, under
Article 19 failure to comply with statute entails a violation of the Constitution, the TCC
claims to exercise a certain power of review of whether statute has been complied with or
not. Hence, it is not easy to say that there is usurpation of competence for the TCC.
Nevertheless, the Courts of Assize have a different opinion. According to them, the TCC’s
decision exceeding constitutional limits is null and not binding. At this stage, the following
question becomes critical: Do the Courts of Assize have such an authority?
Interestingly, the answer to the question is not clear in the Turkish literature. In the Turkish
doctrine, the scope of binding effect of the TCC’s decisions is controversial. Likewise,
whether any court or authority can declare the TCC’s decision as null or not was also
discussed in the Turkish literature in the past.
The Old Debate on the Binding Effect of the TCC’s Decisions
According to Article 153 of the Constitution, “Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be
published immediately in the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the legislative,
executive, and judicial organs, on the administrative authorities, and on persons and
corporate bodies.”
The Article is explicit at first sight. Yet, the Turkish doctrine makes a distinction between res
judicata, force of law and binding effect within the scope of the Article. And there is the
complex question on which parts of the decision the binding effect applies.  Some of the
scholars defended that the TCC -as a guardian of the Constitution- is the authoritative and
the only interpreter of the Constitution and therefore the binding effect must also cover the
ground of their decisions.[6] On the other hand, other scholars -including the President and
a judge of the TCC- were arguing that the ground of the Court’s decision is not binding, but
only a part of the final order.[7] (The debate, besides being a technical law discussion, also
contained political tension since the TCC brought the ban on the headscarf in universities in
the reasoning of their Headscarf-II decision.[8])
Judiciary bodies also have different opinions on this issue. For the TCC, the reasoning of
their decisions is binding for other courts, whereas for the Council of State, it is not the
reasoning but the final order which is of binding nature.
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Today, the debate is revived within the context of a constitutional complaint. In my opinion,
the final order and the grounds of the decision are inseparable in this case as the TCC
holds that “a copy of the decision to be sent to the Assize Court in order to eliminate the
consequence of the violation” on the part of the final order.
The Old Debate over the “Nullity” of the TCC’s Decisions
The debate on the nullity of the TCC’s decision is not a new topic for Turkey. Nullity
became the main topic during the 2007-2008 unconstitutional constitutional amendment
process. The TCC annulled amendments to the Constitution concerning the principle of
equality and the right to education, which had been enacted by the parliament in order to
abolish the headscarf ban in universities. In an important and controversial decision
(Headscarf-III decision[9]), the TCC ruled that the amendments were unconstitutional as
they infringed on the constitutional provision mandating a laic state.[10]
The decision of the TCC had led to a constitutional crisis in Turkey. Some of the scholars,
including an old TCC rapporteur-judge and a prominent public law professor[11], suggested
that the TCC’s decision involved “functional usurpation” which lead to nullity of the decision,
therefore, each court in Turkey had the authority to declare nullity of the decision. But at
that time, no such decision was given by a court. Today, the debate is revived within the
context of constitutional complaint. In my opinion, the TCC’s decision is consistent with
their former case-law and the case-law of Strasbourg. The reaction of the Court of Assize is
extreme.
Is this the first non-execution of the TCC’s Decision?
It is not the first time that a decision given by the TCC is not executed in Turkey. The
Selman Kerimoğlu and others decision which was not executed as required can be given
as an example.[12] In that case, the applicant’s relative who had been transferred to an
insecure hotel by public authorities after the Van earthquake consequently died during the
aftershocks. The TCC found a violation of the right to life since the competent authorities
had not allowed investigation for the responsible officials. The applicants made a new
constitutional complaint to the TCC and the case is still pending. There are other decisions
which are alleged to be non-executed. Nevertheless, it is the first time that a TCC decision
related to the right to liberty and security was not executed
Possibilities for the Future
So what could be next for the journalists? There are at least four possibilities:
The first possibility is that the Courts of Assize can issue an order for the release of
journalists in the near future which would mean that the constitutional crisis would end
without deepening further.
The second possibility is that either the TCC or the ECtHR may rule for a new violation
decision. In this case, the decision, especially from the ECtHR’s side, would probably
encompass not only the violation of the right to liberty and security, but also the right to a
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fair trial due to the fact the execution of the TCC decision has been refused by the first
instance courts. Moreover, the TCC might also take necessary actions for release, in other
words, the TCC may exercise its authority to order directives of how the judgments should
be executed, as prescribed by Article 50 § 1 of the Code on Establishment and Rules of
Procedures of the Constitutional Court. This is also possible for the ECtHR.[13]
The third possibility is that the Courts of Assize might issue a final judgment in the near
future. If the court issues an order for conviction, the Şahin Alpay and Mehmet Altan cases
would no longer be discussed within the context of the right to liberty and security (Art. 5 § 1
[c] or 5 § 3). Since the Court of Assize would pronounce guilt, impose a sentence of
imprisonment and order continuing detention pending disposal of the appeal, then the
ECtHR or the TCC would probably consider that the detention does not fall within the right
to liberty.[14] Thus, after the judgment, the violations of the right to a fair trial or the
principle of legality of crimes and punishments or the freedom of expression can be brought
before the TCC only after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In such a circumstance,
the TCC and/or the ECtHR having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and
the urgent need to put an end to the violations of freedom of expression, might hold that as
one of the means to discharge obligation, competent authority shall secure the applicant’s
immediate release.[15]
The fourth possibility is that the Courts of Assize might issue a final judgment in the near
future, but both the TCC and ECtHR can still consider the judgment through the lens of the
right to liberty and security (Art. 5 § 1 [a]) and find that the applicants’ conviction had been
the result of a “flagrant denial of justice”, since they had not had a fair trial before the assize
court.[16] However, the execution of the new possible decision by the first instance courts
is still ambiguous.
It should be noted that there is also a sword of politics swaying over all of these
possibilities. But in any case, a constitutional crisis seems to be deepening in the short
term. Nevertheless, Turkey and the TCC also have enough experience to overcome this
crisis, albeit in the long term.
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